We examine the long-term effect of Medicare payment reductions on patient outcomes as a result of Balance Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. We classify hospitals into small, moderate, and large cuts categories using instrumental variable approach, and examine outcomes throughout1995-1997 (pre-BBA), 1998-2000 (initial-BBA), and 2001-2005 (post-BBA). We find that mortality trends stay similar across hospitals during the first two periods. Mortality trend diverged in 2001-2005: hospitals facing large payment cuts experienced increased mortality rates relative to that of hospitals facing small cuts. The results are partly explained by reduced staffing and operating cost following BBA in large cut hospitals.
Introduction
Health policy researchers and decision makers have long been concerned about the relationship between provider payment generosity and quality of care for many reasons. On one hand, there is a common perception that providers are operating beyond the "flat of the curve" where additional care/spending may have no health benefits or can actually harm patients' wellbeing. Therefore, reductions in the provider payments may not necessarily hurt quality. On the other hand, fear that provider payment cuts can affect the access and quality of care has led to President Obama signing a legislation that delayed a scheduled 23% Medicare payment cut to physicians in 2010 by a year. Conceptually, a reduction in provider reimbursement does not necessarily lead to worse quality, because such effect will depend on multiple factors, including size of the payment cuts, the incentives imbedded in the payment methods, the production efficiency of the provider, and the payment generosity of other payers. For example, a hospital facing large Medicare payment reductions can potentially recuperate some of the Medicare revenue loss by charging private health plans higher prices (a practice that is commonly referred to as "cost shift"), thus limiting the potential adverse effect on quality. Alternatively, hospitals facing increased financial pressure may try to become more cost efficient without hurting patient care. However, it is still possible that some hospitals facing large reductions from payers will have to implement more drastic cost saving actions that can lead to worse patient outcomes.
The empirical literature generally has not found a long-term adverse effect of hospital payment reductions on patient outcomes, mainly using evidence from Medicare payment reductions due to the introduction of Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1980s and from private payment reductions due to the rise and growth of managed care in the early 1990s. However, the Balance Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 represents the first substantial payment cuts from Medicare since the introduction of PPS in an environment that did not leave hospitals much room to maneuver. We argue that it is important to reconsider the effect of payment generosity on quality of care in the context of BBA for several reasons. First, Medicare BBA reductions occurred after a sustained period of declining inpatient admissions and length of stay, as well as aggressive payment negotiations from managed care plans. As a result, hospital actions to produce further savings in this environment are likely to have direct consequences on patient outcomes than in the previous decade. Second, the relationship between Medicare payment and patient outcomes depends on how much providers can recuperate the Medicare payment reduction from private payers (i.e., the degree of cost shifting). Cost shifting might be more likely to occur in early 1980s when the hospital environment was less competitive, thus moderating the degree of financial pressure. In contrast, a hospital's ability to cost shift was more limited in late 1990s as the environment became more price competitive. A recent study shows that hospitals on average shifted just 21% of BBA payment reductions to private payers between 1996 and 2000 (Wu 2010 ). Therefore, hospitals may have to absorb most of the BBA cuts. Lastly, the effect of payment cuts on quality might not be immediate as quality changes are the result of rearrangements of resource allocation over time. Therefore, it is important to examine the impact over a longer period of time.
Examining the effect of BBA on patient quality is especially timely in light of the recent Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), which include legislated Medicare payment cuts to providers. Understanding the long-term effect of BBA payment reduction can provide insight on the likely long-term effect of the ACA.
This study uses a plausible exogenous source of Medicare payment reduction -the BBA of 97-to study the long-term effect of provider payment cuts. The BBA serves as a valid instrument because it is an exogenous shock to the hospitals, and its broad provisions means the payment cuts affect a heterogeneous group of hospitals, ranging from major teaching hospitals, hospitals that serve disproportionately low-income patients, and hospitals that treat high cost patients. We also fill in a very important gap in the empirical literature, which has very limited evidence on the impact of BBA on patient outcomes. Our study examines both short-term and long-term patient outcomes, as well as tracking patient outcomes many years after BBA was first implemented. Using an instrumental variable approach with difference-indifference-in-differences (DDD) design, we find evidence that Medicare AMI patient outcomes became worse as a result of BBA, and the adverse effect was not measurable until several years after the policy took place. We also explore the potential mechanisms in hospital operations that lead to the worse patient outcomes. The results appear to indicate a resource-constraint story: the higher Medicare AMI mortalities seen in large cut hospitals are likely the consequence of lower nurses and staff employed per bed, and the substantially less financial resources (operating costs per bed) utilized. Although largest-cut hospitals did try to substitute some Medicare patients with private patients and reduced length-ofstays, the degree of these behavioral responses are small and the total inpatient volume is declining.
Background and Literature Review
The pressure to reduce the growth rate in Medicare spending coupled with the concern that Medicare may be overpaying providers in the mid-1990s led to the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 by the Clinton Administration (Newhouse, 2002) . Fundamentally, the BBA slowed Medicare spending growth mainly by reducing inpatient PPS payments and eliminating most of the cost-reimbursement portion that remained in the program. BBA reduced inpatient payment by reducing (i) the yearly overall payment update factor that is supposed to reflect inflation, (ii) the reimbursing increment for teaching hospitals, (iii) the amount available to hospitals serving disproportionate share of low-income patients (DSH); and by (iv) changing the payment formula of outlier payments for costly patients.
The BBA has instituted the largest public payment reduction since the introduction of PPS in 1980s. Researchers estimated that changes in inpatient payment alone would reduce Medicare expenditures by 40 billion between 1998-2002 (Guterman 2000) , and about 35% of US hospitals' profit margins fell to negatives by 2000 as a result of BBA (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2005) . Since then, several legislations were passed to relief some of the BBA cuts. For example, the Historically, the hospital sector has experienced three major payment reductions: Medicare payment reduction due to the switch of cost-based payment to PPS in early 1980s, the reduction from private payers due to the rise of managed care in the 1990s, and again another major Medicare payment cuts in the late 1990s due to BBA of 1997. There is a large volume of empirical literature examining the effects of these payment reductions on different dimensions of quality from the first two events. Evidence suggests that the introduction of PPS led to decreased length of stay (Newhouse and Byrne 1988; Hodgkin and McGuire 1994; Cutler 1995) , reduced service intensity (Feder, Hadley et al. 1987) , and more patients being discharged in unstable conditions (Kosecoff, Kahn et al. 1990 ). However, a series of other papers show that while in-hospital and short-term mortality rates might have increased, there is no effect on 1-year mortality in the years immediately following PPS (Kahn, Keeler et al. 1990; Kahn, Rubenstein et al. 1990; Rogers, Draper et al. 1990) or over more extended periods (Staiger and Gaumer 1992; Cutler 1995; Shen 2003 ). There are also ample studies on the effects of managed care, and the general consensus is that the growth and expansion of managed care has resulted in lower hospital payments, fewer inpatient admissions and expensive services/procedures, and no noticeable changes in patient outcomes (Miller and Luft 1994; Miller and Luft 1997; Miller and Luft 2002) .
In contrast to the prior 2 major events, there are fewer studies examining the impact of BBA 97 and results from these studies are mixed. A collection of studies have shown that BBA has adversely affected hospitals' financial conditions, and hospitals with worse financial conditions cut back on investments in infrastructure, nursing staff, patient support services, patient safety and quality enhancing activities (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2005; Bazzoli, Clement et al. 2007; Lindrooth, Clement et al. 2007; Bazzoli, Chen et al. 2008; Zhao, Bazzoli et al. 2008 ). However, studies examining patient outcomes directly find no or minimal impact on surgical or all patient 30-day mortality in 2001 as a result of Medicare BBA cuts (Schwartz, Peterson et al. 2004; Volpp, Konetzka et al. 2005; Seshamani, Schwartz et al. 2006; Seshamani, Zhu et al. 2006) . A recent study by (Kaestner and Guardado 2008) showed that up to 10% change in Medicare reimbursement as a result of geographic re-classification has no effect on nurse staffing or patient outcomes. Taken together, prior literature suggests that some aspects of patient care may be affected by BBA of 97, but there is no short-term effect of Medicare reimbursement cuts on patient mortality up to one year after effective BBA provisions (i.e., 2001) .
The review of literature shows surprisingly little research examining the effect of Medicare reimbursement cuts on quality due to BBA. This study adds to the literature by studying the long-term impact of Medicare payment cuts on hospital quality. We use two methodological designs to address the endogenous problem between Medicare revenue and mortality. First, we simulate a "revenue loss" variable due to BBA reimbursement changes, and use it to instrument for changes in actual Medicare revenue. Second, we examine the impact of this instrumented Medicare revenue loss on patient mortality using a pre-post difference-in-differences (DD) estimation. We compare the change in mortality among hospitals facing large payment cuts before and after BBA, relative to the pre-post change among hospitals facing small cuts. In essence we implemented a DDD model as we use a long 11-year panel with 3 study periods -1995 -1997 (pre-BBA), 1998 -2000 (initial-BBA), and 2001 -2005 , so that we can more effectively control for any systematic differences in pre-BBA trends between hospitals that may explain the differences in observed post-trends. We provide details about the data and the methodology in the following sections. 
Data

Empirical Methodology
First Stage Estimation: Instruments for Medicare revenue change
An empirical concern in estimating the effect of Medicare revenue reduction on patient outcomes is that the observed change in Medicare revenue is endogenous, because hospitals may respond to the BBA cuts by upcoding diagnostic groups or inflating patient charges for higher outlier payments and such behavior is likely correlated with patient outcomes. In addition, there may be unobserved hospital characteristic that is correlated with both Medicare revenue and outcomes. We use an instrumental variable exploiting the exogenous variation in changes in Medicare reimbursement as a result of policy change following Shen (2003) , Dafny (2005) and Wu (2010) . We use two instruments:
"BBA bite" and share of Medicare discharges in 1996 to capture two exogenous sources of variations in Medicare payments. The "BBA bite" captures policy changes in unit DRG price and is calculated in several steps. We first simulate a Laspeyres DRG price index given the provisions in the BBA while holding inputs at the pre-BBA (1996) 
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It is worth noting that changes in DRG prices due to BBA vary across hospitals. The BBA reduced inpatient payments by holding the DRG annual updates well below the market basket growth, and by altering payment formulas that effectively reduce payments to indirect medical education (IME), disproportionate share hospitals (DSH), and outlier adjustments (OUT).
Therefore, the variation in the total BBA payment reduction comes from both differences in DRG price cut and Medicare share across hospitals. Teaching hospitals, for example, may experience a greater DRG price cut than others due to major reductions in IME. However, because major teaching hospitals don't typically serve large numbers of Medicare patients, the total BBA impact is moderated by a hospital's Medicare share to render it comparable to other hospitals that serve predominately Medicare patients. As such, BBA exposes a heterogeneous group of hospitals to experience a similar degree of Medicare payment cuts.
Based on the predicted Medicare revenue change from this first stage estimation, we classify hospitals into 3 payment cut categories: small, moderate, and large cut (details below). The categorical variable then becomes an input in the second stage estimation.
Second Stage Estimation Model
To estimate the effect of the change in Medicare reimbursement on mortality, we implement a hospital fixed-effects model and use the following specification in the second stage: Specifically, 1995 Specifically, -1997 is defined as the "pre-BBA" period and is the reference period that allows us to control for possible differential trend in the baseline across different payment cut categories.
The period 1998-2000 is the "initial BBA" period when the majority of BBA inpatient payment cuts were effective, and 2001-2005 is considered the "post-BBA" period. .
With the inclusion of hospital and year dummies, the interaction between "large cuts" and the "1998-2000" period dummy (i.e., coefficient, β 1 ) identifies the change in patient mortality rates between pre-BBA and immediately after BBA periods for hospitals that experienced large cuts in payment and compares that difference to the group of hospitals that only experienced small payment cuts (the reference hospital group). One should note that the main effect of period dummies and payment cut categories are not included because they do not vary over time for each hospital, and our identification of the payment cut effects comes through comparing changes across periods and across the payment cut categories. This is essentially a DDD estimation approach. Similarly, β 2 , allows us to examine whether the difference in mortality rate trends between pre-and post-BBA periods is the same between hospitals that experience small and large payment cuts. We use moderate cuts as yet another experiment group, and the interaction terms are identified similarly and have parallel interpretations. The hospital's fixed-effects control for idiosyncratic time-invariant hospital characteristics that may affect the change in mortality systematically. These fixed effects also control for the differences in initial hospital status such as payer mix and financial conditions prior to BBA. Year dummies control for secular time trends in each year. We also add in several time-varying hospital and market variables that are important in determining the change in mortality rates (details in the control variable session below). We estimated bootstrap standard errors in the second stage regressions to account for the fact that our payment cut categories are based on predicted values from the first stage regression.
Dependent Variable
Our main dependent variables are risk-adjusted AMI mortality rates among Medicare patients, measured as death within hospital, within 7 days, 30 days, 90 days, and one year from admission date. These were aggregated hospitalspecific outcome measures derived from patient-level regressions that included hospital indicators and fully interacted patient demographic covariates (five age groups, gender, race, and urban or rural residence) as well as 17 comorbidity measures to control for severity of the illness following the methodology in prior work (Skinner and Staiger 2009 ). In other words, instead of using the actual percentage of patients who die in each hospital as the outcome measure, we use these risk adjusted hospital intercepts, which represent the mean value of outcomes for each hospital holding patient characteristics constant.
To explore the potential mechanisms of how patient mortality may be affected, we examine the level of staffing, operating cost, and length of stay.
Nurse staffing levels have been shown to be directly associated with patient outcomes, so we include both full-time equivalent (FTE) registered nurses (RN) and licensed practical nurses (LPN). We also examine the total staffing levels (FTE). To capture overall resources or inputs utilized at a hospital we examine changes in total operating cost per 1996 bed. Hospital beds are fixed at the 1996 level to avoid a potential endogeneity problem between hospital bed (size) and patient outcomes. Because a patient's mortality at discharge is a function of how long the patient stays in a hospital, we couple our analysis on in-hospital mortality with that on length-of-stay. Because BBA cuts DRG price and thus makes private patients more profitable at the margin, hospitals can potentially substitute Medicare patients with more private patients. We examine the effect of BBA on percent total discharges by Medicare and by private payers, as well as the total inpatient volume measured by total (all-payer) inpatient discharges (log transformed).
Control Variables
Medicare Case-mix. Patient mortality is a function of patient severity. We explicitly account for AMI patient severity in calculating the risk-adjusted mortality rates. In addition, we control for the general severity of Medicare patients in a hospital, captured by the Medicare case-mix index, in the second stage regression.
Hospital bed sizes and occupancy rates. Hospital size can be correlated with the economy of scales in production and/or efficiency. We use staffed beds (log transformed) and occupancy rates to control for such characteristics.
Public, teaching, and for-profit (FP). Literature has suggested that public and major teaching hospitals tend to have different levels of quality, thus we include a dummy for each ownership type (government, for-profit, and not-forprofit). A major teaching hospital is defined as a hospital with resident-to-bed ratio equal to or greater than 0.25.
Hospital system. Systems can provide more resources such as management expertise and information infrastructure that can affect quality.
Hospital systems can also affect quality by altering the competitive environment of health plan-hospital negotiation. The variable is an indicator of whether a hospital belongs to a hospital system. HMO penetration and hospital HHI. Literature suggests that the health plan-hospital negotiation depends in part on both the prevalence of managed care plans in the market and the number and size of competing hospitals in the market where the plan is purchasing services. Therefore, we include HMO penetration as measured by the percent of population enrolled in a HMO plan in a MSA.
Hospital market structure is measured by a hospital-specific HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). This index is derived using actual zip code level patient flow data from Medicare discharge data (MEDPAR file) to calculate the concentration of patient admissions, without imposing a geographic boundary for each hospital market (Melnick, Zwanziger et al. 1992) . Table 1 also shows that most of the changes in hospital characteristics over time are similar between large-and small-cut hospitals except in the following cases. The large-cut hospitals switched from having relatively sicker to healthier patients (case-mix) and from slightly higher to lower occupancy rates compared to the smallest cut hospitals between pre-and post-BBA periods.
Results
Large-cut hospitals maintained similar size (as measured by number of beds)
while the small-cut hospitals have grown in their size. While Medicare discharges went down by 3% for large-cut hospitals when comparing pre-BBA to post-BBA period, private discharges went up by 5%. We use two tests to examine the validity of our instruments. The first-stage F-statistics is 26, indicating that the instruments are indeed significant predictors of the actual payment change. We performed the Sargan over-identification test to evaluate whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and in all models, we failed to reject the hypothesis of no correlation. As discussed in the methods section, our variables of interest are the three BBA payment cut categories (i.e., whether a hospital is subject to small, moderate, or large cuts due to BBA of 1997, where the reference group is the small cuts category) and their In Table 3 , we explore the possibility that the worse quality after the initial BBA period for hospitals that experience the largest cut might be due to reductions in staffing levels. We find support for this hypothesis. Specifically, among hospitals that experience large payment cuts due to BBA, the level of In addition, we explore the changes in length of stay to understand the different results we obtained in Table 2 between in-hospital mortality rate and the other mortality rates. We found that patients are being discharged earlier in hospitals with large payment cut (shorter length-of-stay by 0.23 and 0.28 days in 1998-2000 and 2001-2005, respectively, p<0.01) . The early discharge might be part of the reason that we found no effect of BBA cuts on in-hospital mortality.
We explore further whether hospitals facing large cuts were substituting Medicare patients with more profitable private patients by examining share of patients that are Medicare and private as dependent variables. We find evidence, in indicate that although largest-cut hospitals did try to substitute some private patients for Medicare and reduced length-of-stays, the degree of these behavioral responses are limited.
Sensitivity Tests
There are possible unobserved factors that can confound our findings. We ran a battery of sensitivity tests to explore whether the adverse effect we observe Second, to investigate whether the results are due to the fact that patients admitted to the big cut hospitals are getting sicker over time (i.e., the change in patient health distribution is systematically different across cut categories), we regress average Medicare AMI patients' ages for each hospital, a good proxy for the overall health status of the admitted patient population (Shen 2003) , using the same specification. The results show that change in AMI patient age are about 0.6 year older in the large cut hospitals in post-BBA period compared to pre-BBA period, relative to the small-cut hospitals. Because the age difference is small and that we have explicitly controlled a full set of interaction terms between 5 categories of age, gender, and race, bias due to differential age trends should be limited.
Similarly, to rule out the possibility that small cut hospitals improved quality over time relative to large cut hospitals due primarily to volume-outcome effect (i.e., large cut hospitals might experience a deterioration of quality due to declining AMI volume), we regress Medicare AMI cases using the same model. patients and slightly lower Medicare AMI volume over time, biases from these differences are unlikely to explain away the sizable gap in the outcomes we observe.
Discussion
Our results indicate that Medicare BBA of 97 lead to a widening gap in patient outcomes for AMI between hospitals experiencing small and large payment cuts. We find that Medicare AMI mortality rates between large-cut and small-cut hospitals had similar trends prior to and immediately after BBA was new payments to small urban hospitals. While we can construct a separate MMA bite to single out its effect, it is hard to image higher Medicare payment would be associated with worse patient outcomes. Therefore, we assume the worsening patient outcomes we observe is related to BBA payment reductions rather than MMA payment increases. A second potential confounder is that if hospitals began to have differential quality improvements since 2001 that is beyond controlled in our model, and the degree of improvement is inversely correlated to the amount of BBA payment cuts, our estimate can be biased upward. However, we are unaware of studies that document this relationship and therefore leave this as an area of future research. Another limitation of the study is that due to CMS regulation, we can only examine hospitals with at least 20 Medicare AMI admissions annually.
So our results might not be applicable to very small hospitals (the excluded hospitals represent less than ¼ of the urban hospitals). In addition, rural hospitals might behave different from urban hospitals and our sample excludes rural hospitals.
To understand the magnitude of the adverse effect in the post-BBA period,
we can convert the coefficient estimates into elasticity. The average Medicare revenue cut due to exogenous factors is 18% at large-cut hospitals. The coefficient estimates for this group of hospitals indicates they have 0.7 to 1.6
percentage points higher AMI mortality relative to that of small-cut hospitals.
These translate to about 5% to 7% percent increase in mortality rates. 3 Taken together, the elasticity is about -0.4, implying a 1% reduction in payment would translate to a 0.4% increase in mortality rates. The elasticity for moderate-cut hospitals in the post-BBA period is about similar around -0.5, given that the average Medicare revenue cut due to exogenous factors for this group is 6% and the effect on mortality is 3% to 4%. These elasticity estimates are very consistent with prior literature that finds short-term adverse effects of Medicare payment reductions (Shen 2003) . These calculations are meant to illustrate our main points that with our plausible exogenous identification strategy, pre-post comparison, and the consistent estimates between large-and moderate-cut groups, the significant finding on adverse patient outcomes is unlikely to be completely explained away by potential confounders discussed in the previous paragraph. It is also important to keep in mind that the adverse effect is "relative" in a sense that the absolute mortality rates did not go up during this period. Rather, while AMI mortality rates have steadily declined in hospitals facing small BBA cuts during the entire study period, the mortality rates remained at the same level in hospitals facing large BBA cuts experience.
Our results also demonstrate that inpatient mortality rate, while highly correlated with 30-day mortality rates, is not a very good measure of hospital quality. In-hospital mortality rate is a function of length of stay, which is more easily subject to a hospital's/provider's discretion. Similar to the findings in many studies, we find that payment reductions can induce providers to shorten lengthof-stay. Our findings suggest that using in-hospital mortality rates as the quality measure when evaluating a payment policy effect on hospital care quality will likely miss the true effect of the policy.
The results in our study point to an important area of future research on whether there are spillover effects across payers within a hospital. Most theoretical and empirical literature assumes that there is a common level of quality across payers (Cutler 1998; Glazer and McGuire 2002) . To the extent that this theory is true, the adverse effect of Medicare payment reductions will extend to patients of other payers. It is also important to consider whether there is another direction of spillover from private reimbursements to Medicare patient outcomes, as hospital reimbursements from private payers have increased substantially since the early 2000's while Medicare inpatient reimbursements are still kept at below market rates (White 2008; Stensland, Gaumer et al. 2010 Bootstarp standard errors in parentheses Control variables are identical to the models reported in Table 2 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Bootstarp standard errors in parentheses Control variables are identical to the models reported in Table 2 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
